Litigation by Wheaton, J.
UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
_U.S.__, No. 87-107, 89 D.A.R. 7697 
(June 19, 1989). 
Racial Harassment in Workplace Not 
Actionable Under Section 1981 
Racial harassment relating to the 
conditions of employment is not action-
able under 42 U.S.C. section 1981, since 
the statute is restricted in its scope to 
forbidding racial discrimination in the 
"mak[ing] and enforc[ement]" of con-
tracts. 
Petitioner, a black woman, brought 
suit against her employer, respondent 
credit union, alleging that respondent 
harassed her, failed to promote her, and 
discharged her, all on account of her 
race. The district court held that a claim 
for racial harassment is not actionable 
under section 1981. In addition, it in-
structed the jury that, in order to prevail 
on her promotion discrimination claim, 
petitioner must prove that she was better 
qualified than the white employee who 
was allegedly employed. The jury found 
for respondent and the court of appeals 
affirmed. 
The Supreme Court, per Justice Ken-
nedy, specifically declined to overrule its 
decision in Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 
U.S. 160 (1976), which held that section 
1981 prohibits racial discrimination in 
the making and enforcement of contracts. 
However, the Patterson Court strictly 
interpreted the application of the stat-
ute's "right ... to make ... contracts," hold-
ing that it extends only to the formation 
of a contract; it does not extend to 
conduct by the employer after the con-
tract has been established. Therefore, 
breach of the contract's terms or the 
imposition of discriminatory working 
conditions falls outside section 1981 pro-
tections. The "right...to ... enforce con-
tracts," on the other hand, does not 
extend beyond conduct by an employer 
which impairs an employee's ability to 
legally enforce his/her established con-
tract rights. 
The "same right" phrase of section 
1981 cannot be interpreted to incorpor-
ate state contract law. To do so would 
effectively limit causes of action under 
section 1981 to those arising from state 
law. Such a limitation contradicts 
Runyon. In addition, the Court found 
that the argument that "severe or per-
vasive" racial harassment can transform 
a nonactionable challenge to employ-
ment conditions into a viable challenge 




Justice Brennan, joined by Justice 
Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, strong-
ly questioning the majority's "needlessly 
cramped interpretation" of section 1981 
and noting powerful historical evidence 
of broader congressional intent. 
Will v. Michigan Department of 
State Police, 
-U.S.__, No. 87-1207, 
89 D.A.R. 7745 (June 19, 1989). 
State is Not "Person" Subject 
to Suit In State Court 
in Section 1983 Action 
Neither states nor state officials act-
ing in their official capacities are "per-
sons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
section 1983. This finding is supported 
by the statute's language, congressional 
purpose, and legislative history. 
Petitioner filed suit in Michigan state 
court alleging that respondents had im-
properly denied him a promotion in viola-
tion of section 1983. Section 1983 pro-
vides that any person who deprives an 
individual of his/ her constitutional rights 
under color of state law shall be liable 
to that individual. The state court ruled 
for petitioner, finding that both respond-
ents Department of State Police and the 
Director of State Police were "persons" 
under section 1983. The Michigan Su-
preme Court ruled that neither were 
"persons" under the statute. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice 
White, affirmed. The statute's language 
does not satisfy the principle of statutory 
construction that intended changes in 
the constitutional balance between the 
states and the federal government be 
specifically and clearly stated. The doc-
trine of sovereign immunity is one of 
the well-established common law immuni-
ties and defenses that Congress did not 
intend to override in enacting section 
I 983. Finally, a suit against state offi-
cials acting in their official capacities is 
not a suit against the officials, but rather 
is a suit against the officials' offices. As 
such, it is no different from a suit against 
the state itself. 
A dissent by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens would hold 
that states are "persons" within the 
meaning of section 1983. It points out 
that the "clear statement" principle em-
ployed by the majority to obviate an-
alysis of the statute's legislative intent 
and history applies only to Eleventh 
Amendment cases, which affects only 
cases brought against states in federal 
court. Since the present case arose in 
state court, the principle is irrelevant. 
Moreover, the question whether states 
are "persons" under section 1983 is sep-
arate and distinct from the question 
whether they may assert a defense of 
common law sovereign immunity. The 
dissent would reverse the lower court 
decision and remand for resolution of 
the question whether Michigan would 
assert common law sovereign immunity 
and, if so, whether that would preclude 
this suit. 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 
_U.S.__, No. 87-1241, 
89 D.A.R. 7725 (June 19, 1989). 
States May Be Held Liable For 
Damages in Federal Court 
This plurality opinion by Justice 
Brennan concluded that states may be 
held liable for damages in federal court 
under sections 104 and 106 of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), as amended by the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 (SARA). 
To recoup costs of cleaning up the 
nation's first Superfund site, the federal 
government sued respondent, successor 
in interest of a dismantled coal gasifica-
tion plant which had produced coal tar 
as a byproduct. Respondent, in turn, 
filed a third-party complaint against 
petitioner, the State of Pennsylvania, 
arguing that petitioner was partially 
responsible as an "owner or operator" 
of the hazardous waste site. The district 
court dismissed respondent's complaint, 
accepting Pennsylvania's claim of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. The court 
of appeals held that the language of 
CERCLA, as amended, clearly renders 
states liable for monetary damages and 
that Congress had the power to do so 
when legislating pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause. 
A majority of the Supreme Court, 
comprising Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, conclud-
ed in Parts I and II of the opinion that 
the plain language of the statute author-
izes suits against states in federal court. 
Section 101(2l)'s express inclusion of 
states within its definition of "person," 
and section 101(20)(D)'s plain statement 
that state and local governments are to 
be considered "owners or operators" in 
all but very narrow circumstances, to-
gether establish that Congress intended 
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that states be liable for clean-up costs 
under section 107 of CERCLA. 
A plurality of the Court, comprising 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens, agreed in Part III of the 
opinion that Congress has the authority 
to render states liable for money dam-
ages in federal court when legislating 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 
Mallard v. U.S. District Court, 
_U.S.__, No. 87-1490, 
89 D.A.R. 5678 (May 3, 1989). 
Federal Court May Not Force Lawyer 
To Represent Indigent in Civil Case 
A federal court is not authorized to 
require an unwilling attorney to repre-
sent an indigent litigant in a civil suit. 
Petitioner was denied a motion to 
withdraw from a suit involving indigent 
inmates. Petitioner argued that forcing 
him to represent the inmates in a com-
plex action would require trial skills he 
did not possess, and would thus force 
him to violate his ethical obligation to 
take on only those cases he could handle 
competently. In addition, petitioner cited 
28 U.S.C. section 1915(d) for the propo-
sition that federal courts may only "re-
quest" an attorney to represent any per-
son claiming in f orma pauper is status. 
After a magistrate denied his motion to 
withdraw, petitioner appealed to the dis-
trict court. The court upheld the magis-
trate's decision, and a subsequent petition 
for writ of mandamus was denied by the 
court of appeal. 
The Supreme Court, per Justice Bren-
nan, distinguished the "request" language 
of section 1915(d), applicable to attor-
neys of in f orma pauper is proceedings, 
from the "shall" language of section 
1915(c), applicable to court officers and 
witnesses. If Congress had intended that 
court-appointed attorneys be required 
to represent indigent litigants, it would 
have followed the strict language of sec-
tion 1915(c). Moreover, when Congress 
passed section 1915(d) in 1892, it chose 
not to replicate the language of several 
state statutes providing for the "appoint-
ment" or "assignment" of counsel. 
Rather, it chose to merely "request" that 
they serve. Respondent's contention that 
the federal courts possess inherent au-
thority to require lawyers to serve was 
not considered by the Court, since the 
lower courts did not invoke such authori-
ty in reaching their decisions. 
LITIGATION 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 
_U.S._ No. 88-64, 
89 C.D.O.S. 4541 (June 22, 1989). 
Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Cases 
May Be Enhanced to Account for Delay 
Plaintiffs in a successful civil rights 
action may receive enhanced attorneys' 
fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 to 
compensate for delay in payment. 
The underlying case involved a major 
school desegregation trial in Kansas City, 
in which the district court held for plain-
tiffs on the merits. The plaintiff class 
was represented by a private attorney 
(Benson) and the Legal Defense Fund 
(LDF) of the NAACP. Both requested 
attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
section 1988. In calculating Benson's fees, 
the court noted that the "market rate" 
for his services were $125-$175 per hour, 
but awarded fees based upon a rate of 
$200 per hour. The court used the higher 
rate due, in part, to the delay in payment 
for the services rendered. The court also 
took account of the delay in payment 
when setting the rates for Benson's asso-
ciates and the LDF attorneys. Thus, the 
other attorneys received the current 
market rate for their services, not the 
rate prevailing at the time of the ser-
vices. The court also awarded fees for 
law students, law graduates, and para-
legals who worked on the case. Again, 
these rates were set at the current market 
rate to reflect delay in payment. The 
defendants contested the enhanced 
awards. 
The Court, per Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, Kennedy, Stevens, and White, 
held that the Eleventh Amendment does 
not prohibit enhancement of a fee award 
against a state to compensate for delay 
in payment and that section 1988 awards 
may include hourly rates for clerks and 
paralegals that are not limited to the 
out-of-pocket costs to the attorney. 
The Court first rejected the conten-
tion that a state may not be compelled 
to pay enhanced fees due to its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Relying on Hutto 
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court 
distinguished between "retroactive mone-
tary relier' and "prospective injunctive 
relief." Attorneys' fees belong to the lat-
ter category, placing them outside a 
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
The Court reasoned that if fees are out-
side the strictures of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, so are the processes for calculating 
those fees. 
Missouri also argued that section 
1988 does not explicitly allow enhance-
ment of fees, and the Eleventh Amend-
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ment requires specific legislative intent 
to allow enhanced fees. The Court reject-
ed this argument as based upon a faulty 
analogy to federal immunity. In Library 
of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 
(1986), the Court held that the federal 
government did not specifically waive 
its immunity from enhanced attorneys' 
fees in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (the "no-interest rule" case), 
but the present case is distinguishable. 
The Court found no need to determine 
whether Congress had addressed state 
immunity. Rather, the issue is a straight-
forward matter of statutory interpreta-
tion: whether "reasonable attorneys' fees" 
provided for in section 1988 includes 
enhancement for delay in payment. The 
Court found that enhancement is within 
tile contemplation of the statute. 
The Court further held that "reason-
able attorneys' fees" means compensation 
for work product. Since law clerks and 
paralegals contribute to and share in 
work product, their contributions must 
be included. Since "reasonable" equates 
to "market rate" in the other areas of 
attorneys' fees, there is no reason to 
alter this standard for law clerks and 
paralegals. 
UNITED ST ATES 
DISTRICT COURTS 
United States v. 
Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 
_F.Supp___, 89 D.A.R. 7687, 
No. CV 87-1840-WDK (June 1, 1989). 
False Claims Act Private 
Right of Action is Constitutional 
The constitutionality of the False 
Claims Act, under which private citizens 
may sue government contractors, was 
recently upheld in a federal court ruling. 
The Act, 31 U.S.C. section 3730, 
permits private citizens to prosecute de-
fense contractors or other enterprises 
for fraud against the government. The 
initial civil filings remain under seal for 
sixty days, during which time the U.S. 
Department of Justice may review the 
facts and assume prosecution of the law-
suit. Providing that the whistleblower's 
information is new, he/she is entitled to 
a bounty from the money recovered in 
the civil suit, whether or not the Justice 
Department joins in the case. 
Stillwell, a private citizen and former 
McDonnell-Douglas employee, sued the 
defense contractor on behalf of the 
United States, alleging the company 
overcharged the Army for the Apache 
attack helicopter by more than $175 
131 
_, ._. ______ L_IT_IG_A_T_IO_N _______ I 
132 
million. The defendants asserted three 
arguments challenging the constitution-
ality of the False Claims Act based on 
the separation of powers doctrine, viola-
tion of the Appointment Clause (U.S. 
Constitution, article II, section 2), and a 
private citizen's lack of standing. 
The court, per Judge Keller, upheld 
the constitutionality of the Act in that 
Congress has the authority to delegate 
the power to litigate on behalf of the 
United States. Moreover, the Justice De-
partment may join the suit at any time, 
which leaves sufficient power in the exec-
utive branch. Thus, the Appointment 
Clause is not violated. The bounty pro-
vision affords a private citizen standing 
by according the plaintiff "a personal, 
identifiable interest in the litigation." 
Other risks, involving the danger of 
losing one's job or being blacklisted in 
the industry, also bestow standing on 
the False Claims Act plaintiff. 
CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT 
Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 
_Cal. 3d_, No. L.A. 32284, 
89 D.A.R. 6755 (May 25, 1989). 
Foley Ban on Tort Damages in 
Wrongful Termination Cases 
Applies Retroactively 
Employment cases which had not 
gone to trial as of January 30, 1989, will 
be decided using the analysis and holding 
in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 
Cal. 3d 654 ( 1988), which prohibits tort 
damages for breach of an implied coven-
ant of good faith and fair dealing in a 
wrongful termination suit. (See CRLR 
Vol. 9, No. l (Winter 1989) p. 112 for 
background information.) 
Newman was terminated by Emerson 
Radio Corporation in May 1982 after 
ten years of service. He alleged an oral 
agreement to terminate his employment 
only upon a showing of just cause. New-
man argued that prior to termination, 
notification and an opportunity to cor-
rect the behavior should have been ex-
tended. He asserted that Emerson's 
conduct violated public policy, breached 
an implied contract, and violated the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice 
Lucas, joined by Justices Panelli, Eagle-
son, and Arguelles, held that Foley is 
retroactive, and dismissed the cause of 
action seeking tort damages for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. In ruling on the Foley 
issue, the court upheld the "general rule" 
that judicial decisions apply retroactively 
while legislative decisions are proactive. 
The court held that torts cases giving 
rise to new rules of law typically receive 
full retroactive effect. The court also 
opined that applying the Foley ruling 
retroactively would reinstate "predicta-
bility" in the workplace, in that recovery 
for breach of contract is quantitatively 
more certain than a tort recovery where 
awards are less predictable. 
CALIFORNIA COURTS 
OF APPEAL 
Center for Public Interest Law 
v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 
_Cal. App. 3d_, No. D008786, 
89 D.A.R. 7125 (May 30, 1989). 
Proposition 73 Precludes 
Proposition 68 's Tax 
Checkoff for Campaigns 
On May 30, the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal rejected the Center for 
Public Interest Law's (CPIL) petition 
for writ of mandate in its challenge to 
the Fair Political Practices Commission's 
(FPPC) interpretation of Propositions 
68 and 73, two campaign finance reform 
initiatives which were approved by the 
voters in June 1988. (See CRLR Vol. 9, 
No. I (Winter 1989) pp. 111-12 for back-
ground information.) 
Proposition 68 would have created 
the Campaign Reform Fund to subsidize 
legislative campaigns of qualifying candi-
dates who agree to comply with overall 
campaign expenditure limitations and 
contribution limitations. The court found 
that Proposition 73's ban on the use of 
"public moneys" for political campaigns 
irreconcilably conflicts with Proposition 
68's provisions establishing the Fund. 
The court found that the Fund consists 
of "public moneys", rejecting CPIL's 
argument that the Fund does not belong 
to the state because it may not be appro-
priated or otherwise allocated by the 
legislature. The court also rejected 
CPIL's contention that the tax checkoff 
provision in Proposition 68 operates as 
a tax credit, which is not considered to 
be "public moneys". 
CPIL has petitioned the California 
Supreme Court for review of the Fourth 
District's ruling. 
Newland v. Kizer, 
_Cal. App. 3d_, No. D007649, 
89 D.A.R. 4932 (Apr. 17, 1989). 
State Agency May Be Forced to Promul-
gate Regulations Mandated By I.Aw 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal 
held that the California Department of 
Health Services (DHS) must adopt regu-
lations governing the temporary opera-
tion of long-term health care facilities 
by receivers so that state decertification 
does not force elderly patients to make 
sudden, unprepared transfers from one 
nursing home to another. 
This case materialized when federal 
authorities decertified the Vista Golden 
Age nursing home in San Diego from 
participation in Medicare. The plaintiffs, 
patient beneficiaries of Medicare, were 
required by law to transfer to another 
facility. The defendants were OHS and 
its director, which had failed to promul-
gate regulations governing receiverships 
under which the patients could have 
remained at the facility. 
In reversing the superior court's de-
nial of relief, the Fourth District, per 
Justices Kremer, Todd, and Froehlich, 
held that Health and Safety Code section 
1335 affirmatively requires regulations 
governing receivership. The court dis-
agreed with the defendants' contention 
that section 1335 involves discretionary 
duties immune from court interference. 
The court concluded that a holding for 
defendants would emasculate section 
1335 and that a judicial mandate requir-
ing the agency to issue regulations is 
appropriate, so long as the mandate does 
not dictate the contents of the regulations. 
People v. Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems, 
Inc., et al., 
_Cal. App. 3d_, No. A039377, 
89 D.A.R. 7111 (June 1, 1989). 
Car Damage Waivers Misrepresented 
As Insurance Are Unlawful 
The First District Court of Appeal 
affirmed a superior court ruling that car 
rental agencies are subject to penalty for 
selling collision damage waivers (CDW) 
as "insurance", as unfair competition 
and false and misleading, in violation of 
Business and Professions Code sections 
17200 and 17500. The suit was filed by 
Attorney General John Van de Kamp in 
San Francisco. Following trial, judgment 
was entered to enjoin the defendant car 
rental company, and to impose cost pen-
alties. On appeal, the First District, per 
judges Low, King, and Haning, upheld 
the trial court's findings that defendants 
made untrue and confusing representa-
tions and caused customers to be misled 
into believing that a CDW is insurance; 
and defendants misrepresented the cost 
of repairs and loss of use of the damaged 
vehicle when pursuing claims against 
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their customers. The court affirmed a 
permanent injunction and civil judgment 
of $100,000. 
SUPERIOR COURTS 
Ingredient Communication Council, 
Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 
No. 504601 (Sacramento 
Superior Court). 
Superior Court Hears Oral 
Argument in Proposition 65 
Compliance Trial 
On June 6, the Sacramento Superior 
Court completed hearing oral arguments 
in the case that will test whether the use 
of toll-free telephone numbers consti-
tutes compliance with the warning re-
quirement of Proposition 65, the Safe 
Drinking Water and Toxics Enforcement 
Act of 1986. 
In a related case, People v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., No. 89576 (San Francisco 
Superior Court), the pleadings are filed 
and discovery continues. The ruling in 
Ingredient Communication Council will 
probably be dispositive in this case, 
which involves the same question. (See 
CRLR Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989) p. 
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